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The Enlarged EU and the CFSP 
 
 
CFSP played a relatively minor part in the accession negotiations – indeed, 
with only an acquis politique to demonstrate, the CFSP chapter was nearly 
always the first to be closed. The far more complicated communautaire 
aspects, such as structural funds or agriculture, are thankfully beyond this 
examination.  This does not mean however that there is any shortage of 
topics, falling outside the formal boundaries of the accession process, to 
debate and think about with regard to enlargement and CFSP. It is also the 
case that CFSP, perhaps more than any other area of the EU activities, is 
developing rapidly and thus subject to change.1 From the analytical point of 
view this makes CFSP a challenging area to address since it is subject to at 
least three types of flux: 
 
? CFSP is in a state of flux with regard to the IGC and the draft 
constitution and, with or without a constitution, there will be fairly 
dramatic consequences for CFSP; 
? Linked to the above observation, CFSP will have to find 
innovative ways of adapting to EU enlargement and this will 
mean changes to decision-making and procedures;2  
? Relations with significant third parties (the U.S., Russia or 
regions such as the Middle East) are also being redefined. 
 
In many of these critical issues the acceding countries have already had an 
impact in the context of the Convention – due in no small part, in Poland’s 
case, to the Minister of European Affairs. Aside from the Convention, the 
                                                 
1 Developments in Justic and Home Affairs and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters may also warrant this description. There areas, alongside CFSP, illustrate the 
growing concern with a variety of disparate security challenges facing the Union as well as 
the growing overlap between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security dimensions. 
2 See Guidelines for Reform and Operational Recommendations, Approved by the Helsinki 
European Council, 10-11 December 1999. 
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acceding countries were actively involved in the EU institutions as observers. 
There is though the danger that the period as observers, shortly to end, will 
lull the current EU Member States into a false sense of calm.  It is 
tremendously difficult to begin to assess the actual impact of the accession 
states since as observers the emphasis has been on learning the institutional 
strings and adjustment to the new environment. It would therefore be a 
mistake to treat the ‘observer’ period as a sign of things to come since, once 
members, the new Members will press for their interests based on their own 
distinct geographical, historical, cultural, political and economic concerns as 
well as for what they perceive to be the common (European) good.  
 
Before examining some of the challenges of enlargement for CFSP (and note, 
the word challenges is used in preference to ‘problems’ since many of the 
issues that will be faced are not due to the acceding countries per se but the 
state(s) of flux outlined above) let me dispense with the fairly widespread myth 
that EU enlargement will usher in vehemently pro-Atlantic countries who will 
fundamentally change the orientation of CFSP. 
 
 
The Atlanticist accession? 
 
A comparison of the association patterns of the acceding countries (along with 
the candidates and the European Economic Area countries) indicates that 
there is broad congruence in terms of foreign and security policy outlook. On 
those occasions when acceding countries have chosen not to associate with a 
CFSP position, it was normally due to the sensitivity of the issue for the 
country in question (over, for instance, Russia in the case of the Baltic states) 
or a simple lack of time in which to respond. On the basis of association with 
CFSP instruments, or those adopted by the EU Member States in the UN 
General Assembly, there is little to suggest remarkably different outlooks or, to 
put it more accurately, a similar spectrum of positions are reflected to those 
represented in the current EU Member States.  
 
Concerns about not just the pro-Atlantic bias of the accession countries, who 
were after all also NATO candidates or recent members, was magnified by the 
polarising arguments surrounding UN Security Council Resolution 1441 at the 
end of 2002 and the start of 2003. In this atmosphere it was little wonder that 
the Group of Eight letter3 and the subsequent Vilnius Ten letter, and Chirac’s 
intemperate reaction, are sometimes exhibited as evidence of a firm pro-U.S. 
bias in the foreign and security policies of the acceding countries at odds with 
a European bulwark. However, the G8 letter was launched through the Wall 
Street Journal (Europe) in January 2003 in response to a Aznar-Blair 
initiative.4 It could therefore be argued that the accession countries actually 
demonstrated their European as well as their Atlanticist credentials.  
                                                 
3 The signatories to the first letter were the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
4 See Quentin Peel, James Harding, Judy Dempsey, Gerard Baker and Robert Graham, ‘The 
Plot That Split Old and New Europe’, Financial Times, 27 May 2003. 
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Chirac’s stinging criticism of the acceding countries and even more biting 
criticism of Bulgaria and Romania, drew swift reactions from Chris Patten, 
who commented that the candidates ‘expect to be treated as equals' and Pat 
Cox, the President of the European Parliament, who was critical of France for 
creating its own divisions in Europe. Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Adam 
Daniel Rotfeld saw the comments as ‘harmful and unnecessary’.  The incident 
illustrated a number of potentially worrying trends: 
 
i) The assumption that the accession countries and the candidates 
should be compliant with the larger Member States (which, in a 
sense, they were); 
ii) That the acceding countries should not assume equal weight in 
foreign and security matters which are viewed primarily as the 
domain of the larger Member States; 
iii) That the familiar themes of European v. Atlanticist positions, 
along with intergovernmental and communautaire tensions, were 
far from dead. 
 
The temptation to think of this incident and, more generally, the enlargement 
of NATO, as the root of an either (European) or (Atlanticist) choice is though 
one conditioned more by western European history than that of central 
Europe. In particular France’s well-publicised differences with the U.S. over a 
variety of security-related issues have heightened concerns over the 
Atlanticisation of the EU.  For the EU accession countries (minus Cyprus and 
Malta which are special cases) there is no contradiction in being loyal 
Europeans and being good transatlantic partners. Given their histories, the EU 
accession countries are security maximisers, seeing the value in more general 
security guarantees through EU membership and the harder forms of security 
guarantee being offered through NATO (which, incidentally, may pose 
problems for the adoption of a mutual defence guarantee in the constitution).  
 
The European v Atlanticist tensions were also manifest in other ways, such as 
the Polish decision to purchase F-16 fighter planes which contrasted with the 
Czech decision to upgrade its ageing MIG-21 fighters with the Swedish-British 
Jas-39 Gripen (which was then ditched due to the heavy costs of flooding) or 
the Hungarian choice for the Gripen. In reality, the political symbolism that 
should be attached to these decisions was mainly imposed from outside and 
ignored the fact that EU Member States had themselves made decisions 
based on national priorities and defence-industrial interests and not 
necessarily calculations about how to enhance interoperability and 
effectiveness. 
 
It is therefore possible that EU accession will lead to firmer support for NATO 
on the part of the acceding countries, particularly in those areas where the 
transatlantic guarantees are seen as most vital – notably defence. In the 
areas of soft and hard security addressed by the EU, the acceding countries 
are likely to perceive their interests with the Union, if only because of its broad 
array of instruments with which it may address a broad range of security 
issues.  
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Tow the line? 
 
The specifics of the earlier differences over policy towards Iraq may be 
forgiven, but not forgotten. One of the abiding lessons over the Iraq fiasco 
from a CFSP perspective for members, about to be members and candidates 
alike, was the spectre of Europe operating at twenty-five without a credible 
CFSP. Not all though was pushed under the carpet since a more general 
issue remained, implicit in Chirac’s remarks, of how the smaller EU members 
will deal with France, Germany and the United Kingdom who have shown an 
increasing tendency to caucus at three or, when need be, to operate outside 
CFSP or on behalf of their colleagues. The actions in October 2003 in Tehran 
by France, Germany and the United Kingdom is an often quoted example – 
but there are numerous other examples of such exclusive coordination, 
sometimes to the irritation of the smaller Member States or to the CFSP 
institutions themselves.  
 
This is perhaps one of the largest challenges that Poland and the other 
acceding countries will have to think about – how the new members deal with 
the ‘Big Three’,  or some type of ‘directoire’ as it is often referred to? Some 
have implicitly suggested that the directoire is fast becoming a fact of life, 
even if it is unpalatable to the smaller Member States and raises all kinds of 
interesting questions regarding legitimacy. The arguments forwarded by 
Steven Everts of the Centre for European Reform and Antonio Missiroli of the 
EU-ISS in favour of a European Security Council clearly point in this 
direction.5 The suggestion is to create a consultative council with four 
permanent members (the Commission would also, sensibly, have a seat) 
while the remainder, making a total of no more than ten, would rotate. 
 
Such a consultative council would have the obvious benefit of encouraging the 
Three to work within the EU framework rather than, somewhat arrogantly, do 
what they intend to do outside the institutions in the name of their EU 
colleagues. There is the obvious temptation for a completely unencumbered 
directoire to take cudos for Tehran-type triumphs, while moving complicated 
or messy issues to the EU at large. The arguments for the formalization of the 
directoire may also be strengthened if there is a significant period of time 
when CFSP has to make do with the current decision-making mechanisms, 
the rotating Presidency and need for consensus at twenty-five.  
 
There seem to be three fundamental objections to the formalisation of the 
directoire: 
 
? The implicit assumption behind the European Security Council 
argument is that CFSP cannot work effectively at twenty-five (at 
least with the current treaties) and that recognising the role of 
the three as primus inter pares is a form of flexibility. The logic of 
this argument though does not explain why the permanent 
                                                 
5 Steven Everts and Antinio Missiroli, ‘Beyond the 'Big Three': To claim a global role, the EU 
needs its own security council’, International Herald Tribune, 10 March 2004, at    
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/everts_iht_10march04.html.  
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members of the Council should be limited to three and, 
presumably, others such as Italy, Poland and Spain could 
forward legitimate arguments for inclusion in the inner sanctum; 
? It is not clear how the European Security Council would work 
with the current CFSP decision-making structures, let alone 
those that will be introduced in the constitution. Consider, for 
instance, how the Presidency or the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs might function with such a Council in place; 
? Finally, the directoire could be rejected as undermining the 
legitimacy of CFSP, as contrary to the very notion of all being 
equal members with an equal voice in the search for consensus 
and, for the acceding countries, the denial of a full voice in all 
aspects of CFSP could have unpleasant historical resonances. 
This would not however negate the tendency, or temptation, for 
the Three to operate as a directoire when they wish to, but the 




It is unlikely that the European Security Council will foster much support, 
especially from the acceding countries. There remains though the issue of 
why numerous forms of flexibility are being forwarded, both in the context of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, or outside it;  is it because there is an 
implicit acceptance that the EU is simply not ready for CFSP at twenty-five or, 
worse still, it will not work at that number? 
 
Working at twenty-five – or not?  
  
The extent to which the EU is ready for enlargement with regard to external 
relations can be seen in quite different ways.6  On the positive side, as has 
been mentioned, the acceding countries have demonstrated a reasonable 
consistent pattern of alignment with the CFSP acquis politique and, more 
generally, the EU’s positions in international fora, even if the pattern of 
alignment suggests that ‘homogeneity is more likely to be achieved on 
positions regarding distant countries and regions; the closer the addressees of 
CFSP policies are, the deeper the dividing lines between the Fifteen and the 
future members’.7 Although alignment since April 2003 has shown 
encouraging congruence between existing and future members, it is clear that 
enlargement will offer challenges as well as benefits. As obvious as it sounds, 
the geographical location and recent historical experience of the new central 
European members will have an impact on a number of sensitive areas of EU 
external relations, such as EU-Ukrainian or EU-Russian relations. Although 
speculation, their proximity to Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine, when mixed 
with their individual histories, may well differ from the positions adopted by the 
current (especially larger EU Member States) who are more inclined to 
engagement than containment. 
                                                 
6 See Simon Duke, Beyond the Chapter: Enlargement Challenges for CFSP and ESDP. 
(Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 2003). 
7 Elfriede Regelsberger, ‘The Impact of EU Enlargement on CFSP: Growing Homogeneity of 
Views amongst the Twenty-Five’ in FORNET, November 2003, Vol. 1, Issue 3, p.5. 
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Moreover, the enlargement of the EU will take place without a Constitution. 
Many of the innovations suggested by the Convention in external relations, 
such as the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the European External Action 
Service or the Foreign Affairs Council, will have to wait. The Union will 
therefore have to deal with increasingly complex realities in the near future 
with the current set of largely improvised institutions and mechanisms. 
Enlargement to twenty-five is likely to not only complicate decision-making, 
but to lead to changes in the EU’s interests and priorities. The practical 
difficulties of working at twenty-five might include: 
 
? Further changes in Council procedures so that more is pushed 
to the level of the working groups and less actually hammered 
out at ministerial level. This need not be a negative 
development, but it does raise questions of legitimacy and 
national oversight in potentially sensitive areas of foreign or 
security policy; 
? A slightly less ‘club’ like atmosphere in, for example COREPER, 
where the sheer numbers – which were already stretched at 
fifteen – may pose problems for the Council’s ability to react in a 
timely manner to a variety of scenarios; 
? Competing agendas and priorities, especially since some of the 
acceding countries will have interests in promoting an eastern 
and northern dimension, while others wish to emphasise a 
southern (south-east Europe, Mediterranean and Greater Middle 
East) dimension; 
? Considerable logistical problems in some cases (language, 
small home civil services and travel distances, to name but a 
few). 
 
There is the obvious danger that the introduction of the constitution will be 
seen as a panacea.  Whilst the constitutional innovations in the CFSP area 
certainly have the potential to increase consistency in external relations 
generally, fresh issues will surface such as: 
 
? How will a revised rotating Presidency work and what role, if 
any, will the Presidency play in external relations (bearing in 
mind that the Foreign Affairs Council is largely separate from the 
revised rotating Presidency)? 
? How will the new (and older) Member States react to the Union 
Minister of Foreign Affairs who, at least on paper, will have a 
remarkably strong role? 
? Will the new Member States (and existing smaller Member 
States) take kindly to various forms of cooperation based on 
‘higher capabilities’? 
? How will the new Member States be represented in the 
Commission in critical areas of external relations (external 
relations, trade, development and enlargement)? 
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This is not the time or place for an exhaustive analysis of the draft 
constitution, but it should be stressed that in the CFSP area particularly the 
constitution cannot be considered definitive. The constitution should be 
viewed as one for, perhaps, five years and not much more. The tremendous 
national sensitivities towards European integration when it comes to foreign 
and security policy are shared in new and old members alike and the new 
Member States are likely to be less enamoured than many of the older 
Member States to schemes to communautarise CFSP. The fundamental 
issues of how consistency in EU external relations as a whole can be 
improved and how to address the different modus operandi in EU external 
relations, will survive enlargement and become a shared challenge.   
 
Implications for Security and ESDP 
 
One of the paradoxes of CFSP, and one which will doubtlessly fill a doctoral 
dissertation or two, is how in the midst of the apparent disintegration of CFSP 
over differing approaches to Iraq (nothing appeared to be common, there was 
no evident policy, quite aside from security, but all was foreign) some modest 
but remarkable developments took place in ESDP?  Three operations were 
launched during the course of 2003, in which many of the EU accession 
countries as well as third parties participated. Part of the response to the 
paradox rests no doubt in the particularities of the individual EU Member 
States’ relations with the Bush administration and the need to respond to a 
separate list of security challenges in which the U.S. had little, or no, vital 
interest.  
 
As with CFSP, the experience of working with the acceding EU countries (also 
as NATO members or candidates, or in OSCE missions) in crisis 
management gives grounds for guarded optimism. So far, the experience 
suggests that EU enlargement is likely to bring some ‘soft’ security benefits, 
especially through knowledge of the EU’s new neighbours and borderlands, 
diplomatic expertise and peacekeeping experience. On the ‘hard’ security 
side, CFSP has suffered from a well publicised capabilities-expectations gap 
since the early 1990s and the new Member States are unlikely to alleviate this 
problem, especially as their defence budgets are likely to remain constrained 
by the competing demands of Union membership (this is a point not only 
confined to the EU since it applies with equal relevance to NATO 
enlargement).   
 
In Poland’s particular case its potential contributions to Petersberg tasks are 
relatively substantial. Poland also brings relevant experience to the table, 
such as its support for the Stability Pact for S-E Europe, its UN experience 
(Lebanon, Syria/Golan Heights, Bosnia and Kosovo). Poland’s role in 
including ‘outsiders’ in European security matters will also be of significance 
by diminishing the impression of post-enlargement (EU and NATO) 
exclusivity. Hence the Polish-Ukrainian ‘framework unit’ (at around 2,000), 
created in November 2000, will be available for EU contingencies. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the close Polish-Ukrainian partnership will be 
maintained post-EU enlargement and whether the Ukraine will retain its 
enthusiasm for inclusion in Petersberg tasks.  
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Somewhat more controversially, its experience in Iraq has heightened 
Poland’s profile in terms of willingness and ability to carry out a variety of 
operations. The military reforms that have been carried out in Poland since 
the adoption of its official security strategy in January 2000, and those 
elsewhere in the region, will complement those of the EU Member States and 
assist in planning for future Petersberg scenarios.  However, enlargement is 
unlikely to assist the underlying tensions in ESDP which range from the well 
publicised capabilities-expectations gap, as well as issues of interoperability 
and burden-sharing related tensions. With this in mind three general 
observations need to be made: 
 
? First, the slim defence budgets of the newer members, even 
when acknowledging recent upgrades carried out with NATO 
membership in mind, are unlikely to substantially enhanced 
interoperability. When using a GDP benchmark, Poland’s 
defence expenditure looks respectable (at around 2.06%) and in 
terms of the CEE ‘10’ it contributes $3.3 billion out of $7.36 
billion (2002) – comparable with say Belgium ;  
? Second, enlargement will complicate the debate over funding, 
especially about how the Community aspects and those aspects 
having military or defence implications (which are charged to the 
Member States) are apportioned. Competing communautaire 
fiscal demands on the new members may also circumscribe the 
amount available for defence expenditure; 
? On defence issues the new members are likely to mirror the 
support amongst existing EU Member States for an active EU 
role in foreign policy but mirror reservations when it comes to a 
defence role for the Union (with 67% in Poland’s case being 
opposed and 25% in favour of an EU role for decision-making in 
defence according to Eurobarometer). In part this is 
understandable since NATO is seen as the main guarantor of 
defence-related guarantees, but there are also national 
sensitivities, just as there are amongst the existing EU Member 
States. 
 
The issues to be faced by Poland are perhaps typical of those of many current 
EU Member States; namely, how to balance competing demands while 
avoiding overstretch and how to prioritise. The prominent global role played by 
Poland vis-à-vis Iraq may well lead to demands for greater regional 
participation, especially in a follow-on EU led operation in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. In Poland’s case it is clear that the priority is to develop the EU 
Eastern dimension whilst simultaneously being involved in EU policy for other 
areas.8  The practical manifestations of this in crisis management terms may 
stress Poland’s resources, especially since the CFSP demands clearly 
recognise the importance of Europe’s Wider Neighbourhood, while ESDP is 
                                                 
8 See National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 22 July 2003 at 
http://www.polonya.org.tr/Security.htm  . 
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EU enlargement will be a mixed bag for CFSP in the short-term as the 
process of adaptation to working at twenty-five is undertaken. There are 
distinct benefits to enlargement, especially when the Union speaks with one 
voice at twenty-five. Of course, there is also the risk of cacophony when a 
coherent voice does not emerge – something already demonstrated at fifteen.  
The difficulties of decision-making at twenty five led to demands for increased 
flexibility in the draft constitution in the form of co-operation of various kinds: 
this will pose a challenge for acceding countries and existing EU members 
alike as the delicate balance between the need for flexibility and consistency 
is sought. 
 
Co-operation may also be manifest in the form of the directoire who, on many 
foreign and security matters, may be tempted to act as primus inter pares. 
The challenge for the acceding states will be how to react to a nascent 
directoire – whether to support its possible formalisation, or whether to accept 
that it is a fact of CFSP life while, at the same time, ensuring maximum 
legitimacy for CFSP. This will be a second difficult juggling act.  
 
The enlargement process has been described above as a process of mutual 
accommodation. It is less apparent that the same amount of accommodation 
has been manifest by the current Member States and this may result in a 
certain amount of adjustment as the newer members assert their priorities and 
positions on a number of key issues, including not only the internal aspects of 
CFSP but also their role in defining the EU’s relations with significant third 
parties such as Russia and the Ukraine.  
 
Finally, Poland will bring considerable diplomatic skills, military capacity and 
relevant experience to the EU table. This is to be welcomed. It remains to be 
seen what role Poland will carve for itself but it stand to be a major influence 
in many aspects of CFSP and ESDP. Poland’s role, as significantly the largest 
acceding country, will yield benefits but it will also bring demands that go 
along with membership. Although it should be stressed that significant 
common outlooks and interests have already been identified between the EU 
members and the acceding countries, accession in the CFSP area will pose a 
challenge precisely because it remains under construction. It is natural that 
Poland looks to the EU (and NATO) as security providers, but they in turn will 
become security providers as members of the EU and this means not only to 
the east, but to the south and points beyond. For the existing members, the 
test will be in not only working with ten new members but accommodating the 
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